The Netherlands
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Researchers: Emma Jansen, Fleur Posthumus – WO=MEN Dutch Gender Platform
Authors: Emma Jansen, Fleur Posthumus – WO=MEN Dutch Gender Platform

Acknowledgement and special thanks to:
Dewi Suralaga
José de Vries
Sophie Kesselaar
Members of the WO=MEN working Group 1325

I. Women, Peace and Security Profile

A. Nature of the Conflict

Various ministries in the Netherlands deal with peace and security issues, on national and international level, as part of their mandate. These include, as signatories to the Dutch National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Contribution to International Missions

On a national level, the Netherlands has not been involved in armed conflict since 1945. The Netherlands believes that international crisis management operations can promote stability and restore the rule of law. They can also lay the foundations for reconstruction. The Netherlands therefore takes part in UN, NATO and EU missions, and as such is involved in international conflicts.1

The Netherlands has been involved in over 50 international missions since 1947.2 Examples include the EUFOR mission in Chad to protect refugees, the EULEX capacity-building mission in Kosovo and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) stabilisation and reconstruction mission in Afghanistan.3 Since 2001, Dutch troops have been stationed in Afghanistan, mainly as ground forces. The Netherlands also has six Apache and five Cougar helicopters, as well as six F16 fighter aircraft in the country. The Netherlands is active, not only in the southern province Uruzgan, but also in other parts of the country such as Baghlan, Bamiyan, Kabul and Kundahar.4

The Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) had some 1,200 to 2,000 members, drawn from the Royal Netherlands Army. The most important Dutch contribution to the mission is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which helps the Afghan government strengthen government authority and facilitate the reconstruction activities of the government and other actors. The PRT, which is part of the International Stabilisation Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), falls under the leadership of NATO.5 On August 1, 2010 the Dutch troops left Uruzgan and handed over the command to an international team led by the United States.6 The Dutch Action Plan on Resolution 1325 (see below) states that in all operations supported or conducted by the Netherlands, Resolution 1325 must be included7 and a 3-D (Diplomacy, Development and Defence) approach was followed in the Dutch PRT from the beginning. A study8 on Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan concluded that Resolution 1325 was well established in terms of representation and integration in the Dutch PRT.9 There was a reasonable share of female personnel with some women in leadership positions. The mixed PRT had a positive result, both internally and externally. The team made an effort to include local women. However, due to cultural barriers only small achievements were made. For example, the Mission Team in Deh Rawod actively engaged in creating opportunities for the social inclusion and participation of women. The team was able to convince the district chief, who was considered to be an ‘open minded’ man, to admit women in the district centre. As a result, women are now able to express their concerns there. In order to be able to search female visitors to the district centre, the Mission Team recommended employing a woman instead of purchasing expensive detectors. This ultimately led to the appointment of the first woman in the district centre. The PRT 5 Commander was committed to include 1325 in the preparatory and operational phases of the mission and although the responsibility of Resolution 1325-implementation was not officially allocated within the PRT organisation, 1325 was integrated into the assignments of PRT 5 both at the headquarters level and at the tactical level by the Mission Teams.10

Security Sector Reform

The aim of security sector reform (SSR) is to enable armed forces, police, the justice system and others to carry out their tasks and ensure democratic control over the security sector. As the Netherlands government states: “The Netherlands can contribute to SSR programmes as a relatively minor player, since we have fewer geopolitical ambitions and are therefore trusted.” For example, the Netherlands currently has SSR programmes in Burundi and Lebanon, including specialists from the Ministry of Defence. If is also promoting research and actively participating in the development of policy by international organisations. In April 2008, the Netherlands hosted the international conference on whole-of-government approaches to

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2 The Nederlandse Instituut voor Militaire Historie provides an overview of the approximately 50 international peace keeping and combat missions the Netherlands has participated in since 1945. [http://www.nihv.nl/korea_tor_kabul/index.html]
3 The language of the website is Dutch

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SSR, which it organised jointly with the OECD and NATO.\textsuperscript{11}

Burundi is an exemplary project for the Dutch on SSR. On 10th April 2009, the Dutch government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Burundi. In this eight-year cooperation for security sector development in Burundi, referred to as the Security Sector Development (SSD) Programme. The Dutch contribution consists of two army personnel, two officials of the royal military police and an officer who investigated the possibility of a peace-school in Burundi.\textsuperscript{12} They advise and support Burundi’s Ministry of Defence with the implementation of the programme. The programme has multiple projects, and the Dutch Ministry of Defence is involved in 13 projects and deploys Dutch army personnel when necessary.\textsuperscript{13}

**Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR)**

DDR programmes seek to return security organisations to a size that is more appropriate to their mandate and the financial resources available to them. The Netherlands provides support and funding to multilateral organisations for DDR programmes and works with International Alert, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael and the Institute for Security Studies to develop better models for reintegration. The Netherlands is a core donor of the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in the African Great Lakes region, which is being translated into national programmes in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.\textsuperscript{14}

**Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)**

Reducing the number of weapons in circulation lessens the risk of armed conflicts in fragile states, which in turn facilitates development. The Netherlands supports programmes run by civil society organisations, which focus on the removal of arms from the streets and improve security in local communities. It funds the implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) programmes for the storage and destruction of arms and ammunition.\textsuperscript{15}

**B. Impact of Conflict on Women**

The Netherlands has not actively been involved in war since 1945. However, the scars of the Second World War are still visible in society. Lessons can be drawn from history when looking at the role of women during this war and the effects which are still visible in society, even though 65 years have passed.

During the Second World War, women fulfilled several different roles. Most women were busy keeping their families safe and healthy. The physical and psychological effects the war created on these individuals have long been ignored. A small group of women was active in the resistance. Another small group worked together with the occupying forces. For a long time, the only recognition of the fact that women even existed during the war was given to the group of women working in the resistance. Other women who were brave enough to seek help to overcome their fear and possible PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) in the fifties and sixties were refused help. This was in line with the neglect of similar problems experienced by returning Jews and returning Dutch people from Indonesia. The war was over, life must go on.

Only recently are “ordinary” women being invited to tell their stories and share their experiences. However, hardly any research has been done on the effects on second or even third generation children from traumatized mothers during WWII.

**Impact of participation in international peace and combat missions**

Since the Netherlands is not involved in armed conflict on a national level, the main impact of war and conflict in the Netherlands is the deployment of women and men internationally as part of international peace and combat missions.

Since 2004, through the “Gender Action Plan” and the Gender Force project, the Ministry of Defence has actively taken gender issues into account in its organisation. The Ministry of Defence notes that this is crucial, since this will serve the overall quality of the organisation, as well as the operational deployment.\textsuperscript{14} There are not many women occupying positions at higher decision-making levels in the ministry, although the number is increasing. The first female general was appointed in 2005, the second in 2007. More women are in higher positions in the army, because the Dutch government “recognizes the operational value”. As the Ministry points out: “Often female members of the arms have better skills in gaining good relationships with the local community. This is one of the reasons why the Ministry of Defence strives to recruit more women in the army.”\textsuperscript{17}

The impact of the deployment of women in the Netherlands is present on various levels. Some women are themselves deployed as part of a peace or combat mission, while others are partners or family members of a deployed individual. In both instances, women are affected by the deployment.

In 2006, the Committee Staal (established to research the prevalence of inappropriate conduct in the armed forces) concluded, based on research, that within the Dutch armed forces unwanted behaviour, including bullying, as well as sexual harassment, was relatively common. In 2008, the incidence of unwanted behaviour within the Dutch Defence was assessed again. The report concluded that there was a downward trend for the various forms of sexual harassment for women. In spite of this, incidences of unwanted behaviour are still more common within the armed forces than in any other Dutch organisation. Overall, compared to 2006, incidences of unwanted behaviour, including bullying and sexual harassment were not significantly decreased.\textsuperscript{18}

On other levels, women experience an impact of the deployment. Some deployed individuals return to the Netherlands with physical injuries, while others might experience social or mental health problems during or after their deployment.

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\textsuperscript{12} http://www.vredesmissies.nl/nr%2020burundi.htm

\textsuperscript{13} http://www.defensie.nl/thuisfront/actuele_missies/overige_missies/burundi___ssr/


\textsuperscript{17} http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/de_verantwoordelijkheid/vrouwen meer strepen

\textsuperscript{18} Periodiek onderzoek ongewenst gedrag binnen Defensie http://www.defensie.nl/actueel/kamerstukken/ kamerbrieven/2008/03/46116357/Periodiek_onderzoek_ongewenst_gedrag_binnen_Defensie
Throughout history, it has been recognized that exposure to combat situations can negatively impact the mental health of those involved. In fact, the diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) historically originates from observations of the effect of combat on soldiers. The impact of mental health problems upon return from a mission should, therefore, not to be underestimated. The working group has achieved that the society as a whole, on various levels, including psychological, social and economic. It has been shown that mental health problems among veterans, including PTSD, have led to an increase in drug and alcohol abuse, as well as in domestic violence. It has also been recognized that veterans often do not seek help for their problems, due to various reasons, like shame. Cogis, the Dutch expert centre on the (psycho) social effects of war, persecution, aggression and violence, is currently conducting research on the prevalence of domestic violence among veterans, and the potential relationship with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

C. Relevant Policies


The Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 was released in December 2007. The Dutch NAP aims to be ‘both a joint approach to women, peace and security by the Dutch government, civil society and knowledge institutions, and a framework, as concrete as possible, within which these partners can coordinate their work better and more effectively.’

The Dutch National Action Plan is different in comparison to Action Plans from other countries in the sense that it was not drawn up by government officials alone, but is instead the result of a collaborative effort on the part of the government and civil society representatives. By signing the Action Plan, the government, civil society and knowledge institutions commit to collective action focused on the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This is essential, since all are needed for proper implementation of the resolution. Although there was no input from southern partners in drafting the NAP, diaspora groups were and are represented in the Platform Women & Sustainable Peace (VDV), as part of Working Group 1325 (see below).

The 2008-2011 Dutch National Action Plan focuses on five key aspects: 1) Legal framework, 2) Conflict Prevention, Mediation and Reconstruction, 3) International Cooperation, 4) Peace Missions, and 5) Harmonization and Coordination. A matrix of action points containing aims, activities and executors is annexed to the NAP.

The external goal of the Dutch NAP 1325 programme is to support the creation in fragile states of an enabling environment for women’s leadership and political participation in order to attain a just and sustainable peace in these states.

The group of signatories of the Dutch NAP 1325 try to achieve this goal by supporting and strengthening women’s initiatives and efforts in these fragile states in the field of capacity building of potential women leaders, organisational and financial capacity building of women organisations and networks, as well as by targeted civic education and research.

The aim of the cooperation between the signatories is to enhance affectivity the (supported) activities and to facilitate the use of each other’s capacities, capabilities and (financial) possibilities in order to create maximum output of limited resources. Yet, it should be noted that bringing together (donor) organisations is only a first step in enhancing cooperation between partner organisations. Processes of cooperation take long especially in fragile states, where cooperation is often hampered as a result of mistrust (caused by the war) and competition for the same scarce resources.

As a result of a mid-term review of the NAP in late April 2010, it was decided to leave the initial key aspects of the NAP, and to focus on three themes:

• Strengthening of female leadership and political participation of a number of focus countries, in line with existing local initiatives. This refers to encouraging more women in leadership positions (including exploring the possibility of setting a quota). It also refers to the issue of strengthening the capacity of women and women’s organizations. It was decided to focus on activities in: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.

• Increasing the support for the implementation of 1325 within the internal organization (NAP signatories) and internationally through advocacy and awareness-raising.

• Commitment at the highest level is vital to keep gender on the political agenda. In addition to the institutional structure, it is also important to increase public support within the Dutch society (e.g. at municipal level) and internationally. It is therefore important that women are presented as actors and not victims.

• The internal organization and coordination of the network. The NAP working group consists of a range of representatives from Dutch NGOs, two representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one from the Ministry of Defense, to oversee implementation of the NAP. The working group (WG) is coordinated by a representative of the MFA. The purpose of the NAP group is to support the implementation of the NAP. Arrangements must be made about the roles, responsibilities and expectations. This will include arrangements for reporting on the coordinator of the NAP group, subgroups, practical issues and the role of directors. Within the working group, members are working on the development on what to do in case agreements are not met, this should be clear by the start of the implementation of the second NAP (2012-2015).

2010 Monitoring and Evaluation Dutch NAP 1325 (2008 -2011)

A major strength of the current Dutch NAP is the joint effort on activities. The answers to the questionnaires and interviews for the monitoring and evaluation of the Dutch NAP 1325 in 2010 illustrated that a lot of work has been done. But there are also still a number of possibilities to strengthen the implementation. Currently, a new NAP 1325 (2012 - 2015) is being developed. Like the first NAP 1325, this second NAP is being developed together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and representatives from civil society.

The NAP (2008 -2011) has no clear monitoring and evaluation plan or indicators.

For most NAP signatory organizations, women and peace and security is a priority. In addition, all organizations who took part in the monitoring and evaluation work on female leadership and political participation and advocate to increase support on these issues at multiple levels. The focus countries of the Dutch NAP are Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Colombia and Sudan. Some examples of activities in these countries include organizing local councils and women’s movements, organizing trainings on women’s leadership and participation in Afghanistan. In Burundi, activities were aimed at integrating gender perspectives in the army and police. By focusing on training of women activists, Burundian women were able to develop more skills, such as mediation. In Colombia, one of
the activities focused on awareness-raising concerning sexual violence. Support was given to a large network of women’s NGOs active on fighting sexual violence in Colombia. In the DRC, activities to empower women’s rights activists, as well as to increase men’s involvement in promoting gender equality were supported. In Sudan, a training was held for local women to develop their leadership skills and training of female parliamentarians. Most of the NAP signatory organizations are active in all five focus countries. There is good coordination among these organizations, as well as with the local organizations. Best practices and lessons learned from the activities in the focus countries must be shared.

There should be more effort to include all signatories as equal actors in the NAP group even if they do not work in the focus countries. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should provide financial support to the Diaspora and the smaller women’s organizations in the Netherlands to enhance partnerships among all NAP signatories in the five focus countries. It is also necessary to facilitate coordination with Dutch embassies in the five focus countries to further enhance collaboration with government and civil society groups in those countries.

All NAP organizations are active in increasing public support for 1325. This includes presentations, papers, studies, workshops, etc. To fully use the NAP network and to increase its efficiency, the mutual benefit of the NAP needs to be clear and the exchange of knowledge and experiences needs to continue. National cooperation appears to go well and some activities are jointly organized in 2010. The substantive focus is mainly on lobbying and advocacy and awareness-raising. Knowing this, the joint efforts in this area can be enlarged. Regarding the internal organization and direction, there is a strong need to formalize relationships and cooperation within the NAP group. It should also be made clear what falls within the network and what doesn’t, and what is and isn’t facilitated by the coordinators. There is also a need to clarify expectations and the roles of different actors and organizations.

The added value of the NAP is the continued attention and commitment to the further implementation of 1325. On the other hand, aside from the NAP benefits, we need to avoid that the NAP group becomes limited to just another “meeting circuit.” The extra meetings around 1325 are quite a heavy burden, especially for the volunteers. The originally agreed consultation structure should be reviewed and clarified.

The practice in the earlier years of the NAP should continue—which is to improve coordination between civil society and the Dutch government; and the promotion of mutual confidence in each other as partners. This level of partnership and coordination led to an increased understanding of SCR 1325 in the Netherlands, Europe and other parts of the world. This is crucial because SCR 1325 and the related resolutions on Women, Peace and Security are very comprehensive and complex. The partnership, coordination and thorough understanding of the resolutions on Women, Peace and Security are very important in ensuring that the NAP becomes an effective instrument in translating policies into action.

The celebration of 10 years of SCR 1325 is cited as an example of successful cooperation, and how the priorities for the coming year were determined. The lobby of the 1325 on the political terrain can be seen as best of cooperation and coordination between the NAP signatories. In the first NAP, the lack of clear targets, indicators and a budget, were a major obstacle. This needs to be improved in the next NAP.

In the autumn of 2011 the second National Action Plan 1325 (NAP II) will be launched. This was agreed upon within the NAP working group, and has been committed to the House of Representatives.

During the Dutch celebration of 10 years of UNSCR 1325 in October last year, representatives of all existing political parties expressed the importance of Dutch commitment for the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

During the budget discussions in the parliament in December 2010 later last year and in the first half of this year, several motions were passed on UNSCR 1325, one of which includes the motion of Ferrier Hachchi and Dikkers, which ‘calls on the government through its embassies and other EU missions in fragile states proactively implement Resolution 1325 and calls on the Government at bilateral and international (EU and UN) level performance Resolution 1325 and to remain on the agenda this year to inform the House.’

The ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Internal Affairs are expected to sign the plan. A number of directors of civil society, academic institutions, and the business are expected to sign as well. It is also agreed that individuals or organizations should commit themselves to certain components or activities under NAP II. Dynamism and flexibility and above all effectiveness and performance, are the core of NAP II. In this regard, the analysis of NAP I is very critical and should therefore be completed. There will be a deepening of the analysis and description of new developments. In addition, the NAP II will include:

- Involvement in fragile states, focusing on the countries Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, DRC and Sudan, but at the same time explicitly including space for new developments related to 1325;
- Thematic focus on female leadership and political participation;
- Public support and awareness-raising in the Netherlands and internationally; and
- Accountability - what exactly is expected of the signatories, realistic and measurable objectives and activities, outcome mapping, including budgets.

NAP II will be launched around December 19, 2011 during a public event.

So far, no clear budget is available for NAP II. The lack of a budget was a challenge for NAP I. It is difficult for smaller organisations, especially voluntary organisations that have a lot of knowledge, experience and energy but sometimes lack the resources to fully participate. A small budget for travel expenses for the meetings will already help. Next to that, the coordination is very important and to make it work, a budget should be made available.

1325 Working Groups

NAP 1325 Working Group

The NAP 1325 Working Group consists of signatories of the NAP and other involved organisations and individuals. At the moment, no specific funding has been allocated yet for the functioning of this Working Group.

The members of the NAP 1325 NGO platform contribute to the implementation of NAP 1325 within their own work, based on their specific mandate, expertise and capacities, e.g. by:

- Supporting local women’s organisations and communicating their interests and needs to the Dutch government;
- Network building between local organisations, South–South and South–North;
- Representing community based needs, through local NGO expertise or research and monitoring missions;
• Assisting partner organisations to lobby and advocate for the implementation of UNSCR 1325;
• Acting as an implementing partner to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, providing policy inputs as well as independent feedback and monitoring; and
• Continuing to advocate the implementation of NAP 1325 and UNSCR 1325 in the Netherlands and European Union.

The NAP 1325 Working Group (WG) will monitor the process of the implementation of 1325. Policy inputs will be provided through regular dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries. The Working Group as well as its individual member will also provide written policy recommendation whenever necessary. The WG will also monitor the implementation/integration of NAP in each Dutch Peace Mission.

The primary focus of the NAP 1325 Working Group is:
• Advocating for the role of local actors and the need to link policy development to community based interests, needs and expertise (in order to develop effective policies);
• Advocating for all policies relating to conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict development to include a gender perspective, requiring a commitment from all involved ministries, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as coordinating body, including embassies; and
• Advocating for women to be involved in all phases of the peace building process, including peace negotiations (which the Dutch government should insist on in its diplomatic activities).

Members of the WG strive to increase public awareness and support in the Netherlands to ensure that the Dutch government’s commitment written in the NAP can be fully realized. Through its wide network with local organisations, the WG strives to ensure that relevant information on the problematic around 1325 conveyed by its local NGO partners are directed to the relevant contact persons in the different ministries.

Members of the WG 1325 collaborate closely with and support local NGOs partners working on UNSCR 1325 related issues through:
1. Providing financial and technical support;
2. Field Monitoring; and
3. Bridge between international stakeholder and Local (Women) Organisations.

The WG members, whenever possible, will help link the RNE or any Dutch Mission with relevant local (women) organisations to foster as much meaningful collaboration as possible between parties.

WO=MEN Dutch gender platform Working Group 1325
The Dutch gender platform WO=MEN also has a working group on UNSCR 1325. This is a working group consisting of NGOs only. The NGO Working Group 1325 monitors the implementation of the NAP. One of the successes of the working group is that on request of the Working Group the resolution “Motie Diks” was signed, a national resolution that requests the Dutch government to include a paragraph on the situation of women’s security, health, education and rights in the reported country in all of their relevant “state-of-affairs” letters to Parliament.24

The NGO Working Group 1325 aims to intensify international cooperation, to stimulate more countries to develop a national action plan and to improve the implementation and results of existing national action plans in (post-) conflict countries. The WG members and the government, in the context of the Dutch NAP coordination, are now developing an intensive partnership programme to jointly promote women’s political leadership and participation in peace processes in fragile states. The pilot countries are DRC, Burundi and Afghanistan.

The working group established a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) group that conducted a midterm review25 of the implementation of the NAP 1235. The evaluation concluded that all signatories, in total 19 ministries, CSOs and knowledge institutes, are active in 33 different countries / regions. In 11 countries, three or more organisations are active (based on available data). The organisations are most represented in recent conflict regions and fragile states and less in post-conflict regions and regions with low intensity conflict.

The budget for the working group is €2000. This budget is used by WO=MEN to facilitate meetings and communication between the members of the working group.

24 WO=MEN, WO=MEN Werkplan 2010, draft 17 november 2009, pg. 15

II. Data Presentation and Analysis

A. Participation

Indicator 1 - Index of women's participation in governance (percentage of women in senior positions in cabinet/council of ministers, parliament, local governance)

The politics of the Netherlands takes place within the framework of a parliamentary representative democracy, a constitutional monarchy and a decentralised unitary state.

Since October 14, 2010 the ruling is the government-Rutte-Verhagen. The government-Rutte-Verhagen is a minority coalition of Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) with support of the Party for Freedom (PVV).

The number of women in the council of ministers, including Secretaries of State, is 4 out of 20 (20 percent).26

Percentage of women in parliament
Lower House 39.3%
Upper House 36%
(As of July 31, 2011)27

Percentage of women in local governance structures
The Netherlands has three tiers of government. There are two levels of local government in the Netherlands - the provinces and the municipalities. The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces. They form the tier of administration between the central government and the municipalities. Municipalities form the lowest tier of government in the Netherlands, after the central government and the provinces. The municipal council (Gemeenteraad) is the highest authority in the municipality.

The percentage of women in local governance structures at the provincial level is 38 percent. This is the same as in 2009.28

In the municipalities, women's participation is 46.8 percent.29

All local government bodies have an emancipation policy. The number of women participating in local governance in general is relatively high, but the number of women in high-level positions was very low (only 5 percent in 2008).30 To increase gender diversity in public organisations, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) made an agreement with independent public employers (such as provincial bodies, municipalities and educational bodies) to reach a minimum of 30 percent women in high-level positions by 2011.31

This minimum has been reached and the number of women in high-level positions has increased to 30.4 percent.

Indicator 2 - Percentage of women in peace negotiating teams

This indicator is not applicable to the Netherlands because the country is not in conflict.

Indicator 3 - Index of Women’s Participation in the Justice & Security Sector (percentage of women in the military, police, judiciary, at all levels)

Participation in the military
Participation is 9 percent military and 30 percent civilian (working within the armed forces).22

Participation in the police
In late 2007, the 26 police forces in the Netherlands were led by 23 men and only 3 women. Now there are 18 male and 7 female chief police officers. This is an increase from 11 to 32 percent. Among the 150 top-level police officers, the number of women increased from 15 to 31 (20.6 percent). The overall diversity increased from 8 to 22 percent.33

Participation in the judiciary
In 2010, 52 percent of the judges were women and 74 percent of the other judicial personnel. However, only 11.5 percent of the court presidents are women.34

Indicator 4 - Percentage of women in peacekeeping missions, disaggregated at all levels

As of June 30, 2011, the Netherlands has in total 40 military and police contributions to the United Nations (28 for the UN Mission In Sudan and 12 for the UN Truce Supervision Organization) of which 2 are women (5 percent).35

In total of all missions, the number is 12 percent.36

In recognition of the crucial gender-specific role played by women in peacekeeping situations, some countries have attempted to further encourage women to join their peacekeeping personnel. Belgium and the Netherlands are experimenting with opportunities for part-time work to make it easier for mothers of young children.37

Indicator 5 - Number and percentage of women participating in each type of constitutional or legislative review

Article 120 of the Netherlands Constitution prohibits the courts from reviewing the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and of treaties. This means that, to date, no judicial or other system of constitutional review of legislation exists.38

Indicator 6 - Percentage of CSOs in Task Forces on SCR 1325 and 1820 (out of total TF members)

Resolution 1325 calls on the UN and its member states to take a number of interrelated measures to strengthen the position of women during and after armed conflicts. Within this framework, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked Member States to develop national action plans, so that it would be possible to call them individually to account for their implementation of 1325. Partly as a follow-up to the report to the House of Representatives on this study, former Minister of Social Affairs and Employment Aart Jan de Geus, the minister responsible for

32 interview with staff Ministry of Defense
36 Contact at the Ministry of Defense
37 Nicola Johnston, Peace Support Operations, p.44
coordinating policy on equal opportunities at the time, appointed an independent Women, Security and Conflict Task Force. This Task Force, made up of experts from the public sector, politics and civil society, was active from 2003 to 2006.

The Task Force had seven members, all of them experts on equal opportunities and gender: Annemarie Jorritsma (chair) (female), Magda Berndsen-Johansen (female), Thea Hilhorst (female), Maja Danon (female), Immanouël Korthals Altes (male), Peter Scholten (male) and Tilly Troossnijder (female).39 Two of them were CSO representatives, two were representatives of academic institutions and the remaining three were representatives of the government.

The National Action Plan 1325 Working Group consists at the moment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Civil Society, with a large majority of civil society at 90 percent.

B. Prevention and Protection

Indicator 7 - Number of sexual and gender-based violence cases reported, investigated, referred, prosecuted and penalized (out of total reported)

A fact sheet on domestic violence (2009) states that every year 160,000 women are victims of a light form of physical and sexual violence, 30,000 women are victims of serious physical and sexual violence and 17,000 women are victims of severe violence.40

Figures of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) illustrate that in 2010, sexual violence, harassment and rape have occurred in 3,230 incidents. No public figures were found on percentage of cases investigated and penalized.41

The “Emancipation monitor”42 2010 elaborates on the following figures, relevant to gender equality:

- Despite the economic crisis, employment rates and economic independency of women have increased in the Netherlands.
- Employment rates of women increased from 54 percent in 2005 to 60 percent in 2009. The newest statistics show that in 2010, percentages remain stable.
- The percentage of women regarded as being “economically independent” has increased between 2005 and 2009 from 42 percent to 48 percent.
- Being responsible for the care of spouse is no longer a main reason for women not to work. Three-quarters of the women do still work part-time shifts.
- Both women and men regard a paid job as relevant for their development and social contacts. More women than men find their job important to remain economically independent.
- The share of women in higher and academic management functions has increased from 24 percent in 2003 to 28 percent in 2009. Also, in some sectors the share of women in top-level functions (e.g. in Boards, directors, commissioners) has increased.
- In the 100 biggest companies in the Netherlands, women’s share increased from 7 percent in 2007 to 9 percent in 2009. Adding to this, the share of women working in government institutions has sharply increased from 205 in 2008 to 26 percent in 2010. The share of female-professors has increased to 12 percent in 2009.
- In 2009, women earned an average of 80 percent of the amount men earn.

In the area of sex crimes, prosecution has four policy rules:

- The “guidelines for investigation and prosecution of sexual abuse” includes rules concerning the investigation and prosecution of sexual abuse in general and in dependency relationships and rules for dealing with victims of sexual offences.
- The guidelines for making child pornography and distribution of child pornography illegal, includes virtual (computer manufactured, even if no child is used) punishable.
- The “Guidelines for criminal violation of modesty” states that if the victim is younger than 16 and / or the suspect is aggressive, a more severe penalty can be applied.
- Finally, the Public Prosecution “guidelines for domestic violence” establishes rules concerning the investigation and prosecution of domestic violence. It sets preconditions for the implementation of cooperation between local police and prosecution.

Within the policies for the prosecutors special attention is given to the victims of sexual offences.

Indicator 8 - Number and quality of gender-responsive laws and policies

The Netherlands

The House of Representatives and NGOs have asked for a standalone gender policy and integration of gender within the other focus themes during the House discussions on the Dutch Development Policy for the coming years. The government has committed itself to write a standalone gender policy brief.

The Netherlands has an emancipation policy. The Memorandum “More opportunities for women” (2008) describes the emancipation policy for the period 2008-2011.43

This memorandum replaces the previous government’s long-term policy plan on emancipation for 2006-2010. The basic principle of the memorandum is that, although much has been achieved, the issue of emancipation is still an ongoing one. This is clear, among other things, from the Social and Cultural Planning Agency’s 2006 Emancipation Monitor and from the final report of the Auditing Committee Emancipation entitled “A bit better is not good enough!” A large gap remains between equal rights for women and men and the current social reality. It is necessary to break through the current stagnation in the emancipation process. This is why the government plans to give new impetus to the emancipation policy on a national, provincial and municipal level (p 7).

The memorandum speaks of a changing emancipation process. “In recent years it has become increasingly clear that the participation of women is not primarily a matter of redistribution, but mainly a matter of combining. In the Netherlands, the vast majority of women want to combine motherhood with a (small) part-time job. Women say they would not necessarily work more if their partner worked less. However, women would want to work more if they could structure their working hours flexibly, if they had the opportunity to work from home and if they could keep more of their net income. This is why the government wants to create

- more opportunities for women:
- more opportunities for women in the employment market;
- more opportunities for women from ethnic minorities to utilise their talents;

39 Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325, pg 9
40 Movisie, Factsheet huiselijk geweld: feiten en cijfers, November 2009
41 SCP/CBS-publicatie Emancipatiemonitor 2010
42 SCP/CBS-publicatie Emancipatiemonitor 2010
With the additional funds for the emancipation policy:

a. The Part-time Plus Taskforce, which focuses on encouraging more women to work and encouraging women to work more hours, will receive support;

b. On the basis of collaboration agreements, departments and municipalities will receive support in the development and realisation of their emancipation policy;

c. The Thousand-and-One Strengths project, which aims to guide 50,000 women from ethnic minorities toward social participation, will receive support;

d. On the basis of collaboration agreements, forerunners among provinces and municipalities will receive support to implement flexible opening hours and customised services, making it easier to combine work and child-care;

e. A programme aimed at reducing the segregation in education and the employment market and increasing the number of girls in scientific and technical professions will receive support;

f. A programme for sexual education and assertiveness of young people and for increasing the expertise of professionals will receive support;

g. The national rollout of a number of emancipation initiatives of social institutes that have proven effective will be supported;

h. A number of new initiatives for the emancipation of boys and men from ethnic minorities will be supported;

i. A number of innovative programmes organised by women’s networks will be supported;

j. The emancipation knowledge infrastructure will be supported and improved.

With these investments the government wants to give the emancipation process a new dynamic and visibly decrease the gap between equal opportunities and unequal social reality in the coming years.45

International

On international grounds, the Netherlands has invested in improving the coordination of work in three sectors: ministries and embassies, civil society and women’s organizations.

Within the first area of focus, the Dutch output has firstly been to improve the dialogue between civil society and government on domestic violence. Secondly, the Netherlands has improved the information exchange within parliament on the issue of abortion on medical grounds. Also, increasingly, ministries are encouraging civil society organizations to hand out

loans to female entrepreneurs. The exchange of information on the coordination of gender policy between donor organizations and the government has augmented.

Within the second area, the civil society, the Dutch output has been to diminish discrimination on the work floor; lobbying for sexual education as a regular part of the school curriculum; for women to be part of saving-systems so to financially support women entrepreneurs; increase the capacity of women’s organizations, to help realize and use research-results and knowledge on successful strategies for gender equity and, to create more awareness on domestic violence through active campaigning.

The final area, being women’s organizations, focuses on enhancing women’s networks and organizations, supporting other women and encouraging women’s leadership, listening to wishes and needs of women and letting them be known and, spreading the word on relevant practical experiences and information on different themes and strategies concerning women.46

The close cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs within the 3D-method (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) focused on gender affairs have led to a deeper conscious with both diplomats and the Dutch army. This has led to increased participation of women and increased implementation of gender “elements.”47

The Dutch government continuously emphasizes the need for a focus on women as actors rather than solely as victims. Furthermore, a coordinated approach is necessary in which donors, the government and civil society actively include both women and men to work together in realizing gender equity.48

Indicator 9 - Number and nature of provisions/recommendations in the TRC and other transitional justice reports on women’s rights

The Netherlands is the host country for several international tribunals. The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court built on and extended the advances made in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with respect to gender crimes. In addition, they provided a broader basis for prosecuting sexual crimes as part of the international laws on war, genocide and crimes against humanity. The ICC incorporates mechanisms to facilitate victim reparation and to protect victims’ rights.49

The Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice is an international women’s human rights organisation advocating for gender-inclusive justice and working towards an effective and independent International Criminal Court (ICC). The organisation is based in the Hague, the Netherlands, the seat of the ICC, in order to advocate for inclusion of gender-based crimes in the investigations and prosecutions of the ICC and to promote the rights of women victims/survivors of armed conflict throughout the justice process, including the Trust Fund for Victims. The Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice advocates for the use of international treaties, specifically the Rome Statute of the ICC, to advance women’s rights and gender equality domestically.50

Indicator 10 - Extent to which gender and peace education are integrated in the curriculum of formal and informal education

In the Dutch education system, gender and peace are not formally integrated into the


46 Draft Result Report Millennium Goals 2010, MDG3, page 45 (not yet public documentation)

47 Draft Result Report Millennium Goals 2010, MDG3, page 49 (not yet public documentation)

48 Draft Result Report Millennium Goals 2010, MDG3, page 52

49 http://icg.portaal.com/library/keytext.cfm?Keytext_id=204

50 http://www.iccwomen.org/
curriculum. Some schools pay special attention to the topic of emancipation, for example in history classes. There are increasingly more (Master) programmes available with gender, peace and security on the curriculum.

Indicator 11 - Percentage of women (versus men) who receive economic packages in conflict resolution and reconstruction processes

There are no recent relevant economic packages in conflict resolution and reconstruction in the Netherlands.

C. Promotion of a Gender Perspective

Indicator 12 - Detailed breakdown of gender issues addressed in peace agreements

There are no recent relevant peace agreements in the Netherlands.

Indicator 13 - Number and percentage of pre-deployment and post-deployment programmes for military and police incorporating SCR 1325, SCR 1820, international human rights instruments and international humanitarian law

Dutch military personnel on peacekeeping missions are given special context-relevant training on the roles and position of women in peace processes, before their deployment. They also use a checklist on gender aspects in their operational planning processes.32

Since 2004, the Ministry of Defence organisation is actively involved in the incorporation of gender aspects within her organisation, based on the action plan and within the project Gender Force.33

Throughout the military education the students are told about the resolutions, not in depth but enough to understand them. There is one educational programme specially developed for gender in operations. This education is twice a year and was developed together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is compulsory for people who will be deployed on an individual basis, but also those who want to know more about “a comprehensive approach to gender in operations” can join voluntarily.34

Indicator 14 - Allocated and disbursed funding to CSOs (including women’s groups) marked for women, peace and security projects and programs

Within the ministries, the allocation of the budget is spread over several departments and is sometimes delegated to NGOs. At the same time, many activities are integrated in other activities on women. This makes it difficult to get a clear overview on exactly how much money is spent on Women, Peace and Security.

In 2010, all signatories of the Dutch NAP 1325 spent a total of €27,220,324. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence spent in 2010 a total of €13,449,543 that can be allocated to the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The larger CSO organizations have a marked for women, peace and security projects and programs.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) supports more than a hundred projects in 15 countries.35

The working group on UNSCR 1325 of the Dutch gender platform WO=MEN has a budget available of €200,000 per year.

Funding Leadership and Opportunities for Women (FLOW) is a new fund initiated by the Dutch Foreign Ministry to strengthen the rights and opportunities for women and girls worldwide. FLOW is a successor to the successful MDG3 Fund, which started in 2008. Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation Ben Knapen has reserved 70 million Euros for this fund for 4 years.

FLOW will focus on three priorities: security (including violence against women and UN Resolution 1325), economic empowerment (with an emphasis on food security, land, water and economic rights) and political participation. In these three priorities, female leadership is seen as an important instrument.

There is also money available from embassies, but this money has shown to be difficult to access.

There is bigger emphasis on corporate social responsibility from government levels, while one can wonder if these often male dominated multinationals are the actors women’s groups should or want to work with, as well as if working with and through this really facilitates/ enables challenging root causes and issues. Cordaid has been working with GNWP in lobbying the business sector to broaden their framework of corporate social responsibility to integrate women and peace and security issues; and that such engagement with the business sector is being pursued through partnership with Burundian government and civil society in the establishment of a multi-stakeholders’ financing mechanism for the implementation of Burundi’s 1325 NAP.

Indicator 15 - Allocated and disbursed funding to governments marked for women, peace and security projects and programs

For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, part of the 1325 funding in 2009 and 2010 came from the MDG3 Fund. The other contributions, either through central peace and security funds or through decentralized funding at embassy level, are determined based on project proposals that fit within the funding criteria of the central funds, or are defined in the annual plan of the embassy.

The MDG3 Fund invests in equality and in improving rights and opportunities for women and girls. With a total of €70 million earmarked for the period between 2008 and 2011, the fund is financing 45 activities run by both large and small organisations. These activities focus on property and inheritance rights for women, gender equality in employment and equal opportunities on the labor market, participation and representation of women in national parliaments and political bodies, and combating violence against women.36 According to AWID, the MDG3 Fund was “the largest fund ever created with the goal of advancing women’s rights and allocating resources through civil society organisations working to advance women’s rights (particularly women organisations).”37 Because the MDG3 Fund works with integrated programs, it is not clear how much of the funding went specifically to WPS projects and programs.

51 This is based on general observations, no official source has been used
52 Results in Development, Report 2007-2008, pg. 80
54 Contact at the Ministry of Defense
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010 monitoring and evaluation of Dutch NAP 1325 (not public available)
countries by delivering fast, flexible and relevant funding. From its establishment in 2005 to February 2010, the PBF received a total of $329 million from various UN member states, of which $46.5 million was contributed by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{58} No data is available on the specific allocation to women, peace and security of this budget.

The Netherlands contributed $125,831,219 to the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes Region, which was half of the total donor contribution ($253,036,256) for this seven-year program that ran from April 2002 to June 2009.\textsuperscript{59} No data is available on the specific allocation to WPS of this budget. This is because in most organizations, 1325 is integrated in other projects and is not visible in a separate budget line.

In the Netherlands Strategy 2008-2010 on security and development in fragile states, the Netherlands elaborates on the financial contributions made to development in fragile states. The Netherlands contributes to development in fragile states through direct activities in partner countries. As for other developing countries, medium-term bilateral policy for fragile states is set in the Multi-Annual Strategic Plans. The government intends to step up its efforts in these countries. The degree to which this intensification takes place over the coming years will depend on specific opportunities in these countries.

\begin{itemize}
  \item To realize the above, a coordinated approach is needed where both men and women in donor organizations, the government and civil society (including religious institutes) are actively involved and work together towards realizing gender equality and increase female participation. It is hereby important that the Netherlands keeps its focus on all levels (institutional, cultural and individual) and encourages government institutions to take up a leading role in making a change.
  \item In 2010, the Dutch government committed itself to strengthening partnerships with men through financial support of training efforts. Central to their commitment was the effort of including men to end conflict. Today, the Dutch government continuously works for the inclusion of both men and women in ending conflict and achieving increased security, stability and human security globally. The below given examples illustrate these efforts.\textsuperset{62}
  \item An example from the DRC illustrates the Dutch efforts of including men in increasing security, stability and human security globally. As the Netherlands strives for countering impunity for sexual violence, films and documentaries of the Dutch twin sisters Ilse and Femke van Velzen (sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) are being used to reach the Congolese public. What makes this project unique is that the films are not only used as documentaries, but also as teaching material and a lobbying tool.
  \item The documentary “Fighting the Silence” is being shown all over the DRC using a mobile cinema. In the past year, it has reached audiences of over 300,000 people. Every open-air screening draws crowds of people from far and wide and gets men and women talking about how to stop violence against women.\textsuperset{61}
  \item The last film in the series of three by these talented young women will be released in 2011. This illustrates the ongoing and joint efforts of the Dutch government to counter impunity but also, keep men involved in this challenge.
  \item This third documentary is also about sexual violence, but this time from the perspective of the dysfunctional legal system and widespread impunity in the DRC. This film completes the trilogy, which addresses the issue from three viewpoints – those of women, men and the state.\textsuperset{60} STATEMENT BY H.E. Ambassador Herman Schaper, Permanent Representative of the Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations. Open Debate in connection with the agenda item ‘Women and Peace in Security’, Security Council, Interim Security council
  \item There is increasingly more awareness and knowledge on violence committed against women and men in conflict areas. This has lead to improved methods and leading to more successes.
  \item Though the above illustrates some positive notes, the challenge to show the general public the necessity of gender equity and the actual realization of equality between women and men, especially in conflict areas, is still far from reached. The lack of relevant data and limited knowledge development complicates this task at hand. It is important for the Netherlands to remain focused on achieving gender equality. Apart from increasing the numbers of women in top positions, the Dutch government should continue to give support to the (women's) community to help them amplify their influence. Though awareness on gender inequality has increased, the actual implementation of gender policy and input of resources necessary to achieve this goal, are still lacking. Also, the Netherlands should attempt to emphasize women as being actors (agents of change) rather than victims.
\end{itemize}
A second example illustrates the emphasis on including both men and women in countering violence and fighting for women’s rights. In Burundi, numerous private actors are working for peace and security. For instance, since 2001, the Dutch-based Stéphanie Mbanzondere and her foundation Burundian Women for Peace and Development (BWPD) have been working hard for the sustainable peace that the country needs. The BWPD was founded with the aim of supporting Burundian women in the Netherlands, but it is also helping to boost reconstruction in Burundi. Stéphanie Mbanzondere and the BWPD have achieved good results in a relatively short time.

Public recognition included a nomination in 2008 for the Peace Prize awarded every three years by the Belgian city of Ypres, for Stéphanie’s Social Harmony project in Burundi, which establishes “peace committees” for conflict resolution. Through training courses attended by Hutus and Tutsis, the causes of the conflict were discussed. The participants spend several days in discussion. They speak about current events, but the main focus is on the past. By sharing each other’s experiences, they become aware of each other’s situation. Ultimately, they are able to identify with one another and realize that they are not enemies after all. Originally, only women were invited to these courses. Although they were enthusiastic about the project, they were also critical about the exclusion of men. There can be no stable peace if women are excluded from the process and the same applies to men. It was therefore decided that in future, 30% of the group members would be men, a percentage known as the critical mass for ensuring diversity. Diverse perspectives one’s own conditions, and that of the family’s and the community’s will shed light on the complexity of the situation, such as the fact that children sometimes belong to a different ethnic group from their mothers. Understanding the implications of these issues is essential to achieving a sustainable peace.63

In 2010, the Dutch government emphasized the need to continue the hard work though much had already been achieved. Ten years after 1325, a lot still has to be done and efforts can be improved by strengthening the accountability mechanisms for the implementation, and clarifying the roles and responsibilities for each UN member state and for the UN itself.64

With the start up of Resolution 1325, it was a conscious decision in accordance with the non-binding language of the resolution, to not enforce a monitoring and accountability mechanism. Instead, the NAP signatories followed a pragmatic approach: to develop a monitoring system in the course of the implementation process. After simply sharing experiences in 2008, the NAP actors decided to set joint targets for 2009. That same year, a monitoring and evaluation task force was set up, consisting of government and non-governmental representatives. By the end of 2009, all the ministries and organizations involved had successfully completed a monitoring exercise, which provided data about results achieved so far, and activities planned for 2010. The outcomes of this exercise were subsequently fed into the NAP Mid-Term Review, which took place in April 2010. All NAP signatories agreed on one thing: it was impossible to be involved everywhere so joint efforts needed to be given a specific focus. It was decided that we should concentrate on the following three areas: promoting and supporting female leadership in a maximum of four fragile states; increasing the support base for women, peace and security in the Netherlands by strengthening the network of signatories to the Dutch NAP. Being jointly accountable for achieving the NAP objectives calls for a different kind of interaction between government and civil society.65

Though some efforts have been made, all in all, mechanisms for accountability, enforcement, monitoring and evaluation remain weak and/or underutilized. The dearth of measurable outcomes for SCR 1325 make it difficult to assess the actual impact of the resolution, and at the same time facilitate backsliding on implementation. Reviews conducted for the tenth anniversary have further highlighted this inadequacy and generated momentum for the development of systematic monitoring mechanisms. Although few such mechanisms are currently in place, the recent adoption of global indicators for tracking and monitoring the progress of SCR 1325 is expected to advance this effort.

A more systematic approach in the form of comprehensive, coherent and coordinate action is needed to achieve the goals of the women, peace and security framework. Though prior approaches, expectations, and outcomes have varied greatly, there is consensus that a more robust, coordinated approach is needed to ensure necessary steps are taken and political will is sufficient for further implementation of SCR 1325.

Therefore, in the second Dutch National Action Plan on SCR 1325, a strict monitoring matrix is developed. One of the major complementary strengths of the NAP is the collaboration between the NAP signatories. Therefore, an evaluation matrix is developed with a minimum number of collaborations per NAP-partner type, but at the same time without losing sight of the need for flexibility and unexpected or abrupt developments in fragile states or transition countries. Every year this matrix will be filled out per country and evaluated on basis of its results.

In a report of Cordaid and the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) “Costing and Financing 1325,” it is also recognized and emphasized that not only appropriate coordination but also clarification of roles and responsibilities is a necessity in order to make achievements when working together. The report illustrates this need using some examples from practice. The report, updated in May 2011, also stresses the importance of monitoring and evaluation.66 Adequate indicators, as well as practical monitoring tools are essential for successful oversight. The indicators developed by the UN Technical Working group on Indicators (TWGI) draw attention to the budgeting and financial allocation for the implementation of the resolution. On the part of civil society, the indicators developed by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) assess progress on the allocated and disbursed funding to governments and civil society organizations marked for women and peace and security projects and programs.67 Since two of the most constraints for NAP implementation are political commitment and financial resources, the report promotes Multi-stakeholder Financing of NAP 1325, especially for (post) conflict countries. Cordaid and GNWP are piloting this for Burundi, in collaboration with Burundian government, CSOs, UN agencies and other stakeholders. We recommend that the Dutch government, CSOs, and the private sector support such a multi-stakeholder financing mechanism for implementation of NAP 1325.

Several motions were passed around UNSCR 1325 including the motion of Ferrier Hachchi and Dikkers, which "calls on the government through its embassies and other EU missions in fragile states to proactively implement Resolution 1325 and calls on the Government at bilateral and international (EU and UN) level to keep Resolution 1325 on the agenda this year to inform the House." At this moment, the second National Action Plan 1325 (2012-2015) is being drafted. It is very important that this second Plan has a clear budget, timeframe and concrete commitments. The lack of a budget was a challenge for NAP I. It is difficult for smaller organisations, especially voluntary organisations that have a lot of knowledge, experience and energy but sometimes lack the resources to fully participate. A small budget for travel expenses for the meetings will already help. NAP2 should really deliver concrete results showing real improvement of women participation and leadership in conflict countries. The
plan should include clear targets, timeframe and budget allocation. The Dutch government and CSO representatives preparing the draft NAP II are working on ensuring that the NAP II will include budget for coordination of the NAP implementation, funding for diaspora and women organizations in the Netherlands, as well as funding for CSOs in conflict affected countries through the Dutch embassies. We recommend sufficient funding be allocated for these mentioned aspects.

The House of Representatives and NGOs have asked for a stand-alone gender policy and integration of gender within the other focus themes during the House discussions on the Dutch Development Policy for the coming years. The government has committed itself to write a gender stand-alone policy brief.

Civil society in the Netherlands is looking forward and stands ready to support the government for full implementation of the parliament’s request. We are also looking forward to a more systematic, transparent and comprehensive reporting from the government to the parliament about the tangible progress/results of their implementation of NAP 1325 and the results in conflict countries.

IV. Bibliography


